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DRONE DELIVERY AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
By: Brian M. Miller†
Amazon, Inc.’s fledgling drone shipping service, “Prime Air,” and similar
services, may pose a new threat to private property rights.  Companies that
ship by drone would likely have to fly the drones over private land.  But who
owns the low-altitude airspace above private land?  That issue is unsettled, but
the common law supports the view that low-altitude airspace belongs to the
landowners beneath.  If that is correct, companies like Amazon have two main
options to get drone shipping off the ground: (1) pay the landowners on the
intended routes for an easement through their low-altitude airspace, or (2)
count on the government to compel easements through these spaces.
The second option presents a Takings Clause problem.  Because forced
easements of flight intrude on landowner rights, landowners burdened by
drone easements could potentially prove a per se taking.  But even if drone
easements are not per se takings, case law and the “character of the govern-
ment action” factor in the Penn Central analysis give landowners a fighting
chance to prove a regulatory taking.
Overall, the Takings Clause could be a valuable tool for both economic
efficiency and equity, requiring beneficiaries of drone easements to compen-
sate those burdened by the easements.  If drone shipping takes off in the U.S.,
current law may ensure that the negative externalities will not fall solely on the
surface landowners.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The unmanned aircraft showcases this century’s technological flour-
ishing across sectors.  “Drones” reshaped military reconnaissance and
offensive maneuvers by providing an accurate and safer alternative to
manned planes.  They are evolving law enforcement by enabling
bird’s-eye views at lower cost and better visibility than helicopters.
Commerce is the next frontier.
Companies may look to drones for a cutting-edge and cost-effective
way to build a loyal customer base.  Amazon has announced “Prime
Air,” hoping to enable online customers to click “order” and see their
product land at their front door in a matter of minutes.1  It is not yet
active in the United States to any significant scale, but if all goes Ama-
zon’s way, it will be soon.  The company released preliminary plans
for its “Hives,” business and shipping centers providing for easy entry
and exit of drones.2
Shipping drones do not yet swarm from Amazon Hives in the
United States, perhaps in part because of property law concerns.  To
ship by drone, Amazon would have to traverse wide swaths of low-
altitude airspace.  Shipping trucks and vans can travel on public high-
ways.  Shipping planes can fly at high altitudes within FAA jurisdic-
tion, but most drones would travel within 500 feet of the ground.  As
of now, it is unclear who owns this airspace.3
The answer to this question might determine whether drone ship-
ping gains traction in the United States at all, and it certainly will in-
fluence which companies will offer the service.  If the federal
government owns low-altitude airspace and can regulate its usage
through the FAA, Amazon would only need permission from the
FAA to fly drones in certain altitude zones.  Amazon has already re-
leased a proposal for “drone zoning,” which divides the air space by
altitude levels and regulates usage in those spaces by type of drone.4
1. Dennis Green, Amazon Unveils a New Prime Air Drone it Says ‘Within
Months’ Will Start Delivering Packages, BUS. INSIDER (June 5, 2019, 1:36 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-unveils-new-drone-prime-air-2019-6.
2. Kaya Yurieff, Amazon Patent Reveals Drone Delivery ‘Beehives’, CNN (June
23, 2017, 9:44 AM 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/23/technology/amazon-drone-
beehives/index.html.
3. This article does not focus on the option of flying drones only in airspace di-
rectly above public roads. In such instances the companies may avoid the takings issue
altogether (though presumably such a practice would increase the distance and time
required for most drone deliveries compared to the alternative explored in this article,
reducing the efficiency of the process).
4. Revising the Airspace Model for the Safe Integration of Small Unmanned Air-
craft Systems, AMAZON PRIME AIR (July 2015), https://images-na.ssl-images-ama-
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But if surface landowners own the low-altitude airspace, Amazon and
other entities would have to jump through more hoops.  Companies
would have two main options moving forward: (1) they could obtain
easements of passage through all airspace in which they want to fly
(this would likely require contracting with every individual surface
land owner beneath the desired flight paths); or (2) the local, state, or
federal government could require private landowners to keep the
space open to others for certain uses.5  From the shippers’ perspective,
the major drawbacks of the first option are cost and individual hold-
outs.  The major drawback of the second option is that the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment may require the government to justly
compensate every landowner for the property taken.
So far, the bulk of the literature on private drone usage as it relates
to property law comes from Professor Troy Rule.  Professor Rule
scoured the common law and concluded that state and local govern-
ments, if not Congress, should pass more specific protections for sur-
face landowners that affirmatively establish exclusionary rights to
airspace up to 500 feet above the ground.6  He has noted in passing
that if the FAA instead asserted jurisdiction over such airspace and
allowed private entities to regularly fly drones through the airspace, it
would “arguably orchestrate one of the largest uncompensated trans-
fers of property interests in United States history.”7  Because the ex-
act mechanisms for evaluating drone easements as a matter of the
takings doctrine are unclear, this Article seeks to answer that issue.
This Article will argue that the common law of navigable airspace
and the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provide landowners
with a solid constitutional claim should governments authorize the
low-altitude flights of commercial shipping drones over their land.  Al-
though the case law merely whispers to airspace rights below 500 feet,
a couple things are clear: the FAA has not substantially asserted juris-
diction there,8 and no outside party has the right to fly within the im-
mediate reaches of the land.  These, along with common law
exclusionary rights against other sorts of low-altitude intrusions, show
zon.com/images/G/01/112715/download/Amazon_Revising_the_Airspace_Model_for_
the_Safe_Integration_of_sUAS.pdf.
5. Because no government has forced any such “drone easement” so far, it is not
clear whether such future measures would only prohibit landowners from excluding
drones from their low-altitude airspace, or go further and require them to keep open
certain specific corridors in which no development or any other obstructing activity
would be permitted. The nature and severity of such forced easements will affect
whether such actions are takings requiring just compensation.
6. Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U.L. REV. 155, 158–59, 208
(2015).
7. Troy A. Rule, Drone Zoning, 95 N.C.L. REV. 133, 171 (2016).
8. There are limited exceptions, like the District of Columbia area. See DC No
Drone Zone, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/community_
engagement/no_drone_zone/dc/ (last modified Aug. 7, 2019, 1:35 PM).
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that if anyone owns this airspace, it is the landowner.  Next, Causby,9
Loretto,10 and Penn Central11 give courts a foundation to rule that
forced permanent easements of flight are takings requiring just com-
pensation.  Finally, courts should so rule, because to do otherwise
would frustrate the expectations of property owners for the sake of
propping up an emerging industry of uncertain public utility.
Business owners and landowners alike make investments by relying
on how they expect to use their resources.12  Companies like Amazon
may hesitate to invest in drone shipping if they will either have to pay
for individual easements or gamble on the outcome of eminent do-
main proceedings, which are costly to the government.  Prospective
landowners may be less willing to pay top dollar for land if they know
the airspace immediately above that land will be buzzing with drones.
And current landowners may be limited in developing their land verti-
cally if they expect to have to leave that airspace open for drone
flights.  In other words, the state of the law on these issues, whether
clear or up in the air, will impact both small-scale residential and
large-scale commercial land development.
Part II of this Article focuses on defining the ownership of low-
altitude airspace based on the common law.  It concludes that surface
landowners own the low-altitude airspace above their land by default.
Part III explains why the doctrine of navigability, which applies to
water, should not apply to low-altitude airspace to force landowners
to open their airspace for travel.  Part IV explores why a taking occurs
when government action forces landowners to open an easement of
travel through their private airspace.  And Part V observes how classi-
fying forced drone easements as takings comports with major eco-
nomic theories of takings law.
II. THE OWNER’S RIGHT TO EXCLUDE FROM
LOW-ALTITUDE AIRSPACE
Minimal precedent speaks directly to property rights in low-altitude
airspace.  Even so, two things are clear: (1) Airspace above 500 feet is
navigable and controllable by the FAA;13 (2) surface landowners do
own some portion of the low-altitude airspace, even if this portion has
not yet been clearly defined.14  So, a battle rages over who properly
9. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
10. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
11. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12. See, e.g., Juliet Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and
the Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377, 1378 (Fall 2008) (pointing out that many
factors that contribute to uncertainty may affect contract parties’ incentives to reach
agreements).
13. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)–(c) (2018).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (considering it “ob-
vious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclu-
sive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere”).
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owns the space between the ground and 500 feet.  Court precedent has
left the legal field to quarrel about how low or frequent invasions of
that airspace must be to trigger protections for landowners.  This sec-
tion ultimately agrees with Professor Rule that the common law tilts
in favor of the underlying surface landowners owning this airspace.15
A. The Present Bounds of Navigable Airspace
The federal government has jurisdiction over navigable airspace.
Congress has defined “navigable airspace” to be “at or above safe alti-
tudes of flight.”16  In most of the United States, the FAA regulates
this space, which it usually considers as the space at or above 500
feet.17
The federal government may freely regulate this space because of
an apparent carve-out of private airspace rights by the Supreme Court
in Causby.18  Before that case there was no clear statement on prop-
erty rights in low-altitude airspace, at least regarding unwanted flights.
The ad coelum doctrine was the common law default—landowners
owned the skies above and the depths beneath their surface land.19
The Causby Court took the expansiveness of that rule and put a roof
over it—but where exactly did it place the roof?
Mr. Causby operated a farm and lived right next to an airport the
United States military frequently used.20  Planes often flew over his
land at altitudes under 100 feet.21  The noise from the planes dis-
tressed Mr. Causby’s chickens, causing them to fly into the walls of
their coop and die.22  Mr. Causby sued, arguing the government flights
were a taking of his private property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.23
The Supreme Court agreed, and it made some new rules along the
way.  First, it cast aside the ad coelum doctrine in its absolute form as
“ha[ving] no place in the modern world.”24  Next, though it recognized
the need for a public highway through some portion of the air for
plane travel, it also announced a victory for private landowners by
affirming that they must have “exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”25  The only other step the
15. See generally Rule, supra note 6.
16. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012).
17. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)-(c).
18. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
19.  See, e.g., Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property
Lines, is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 376
(Fall 2014).
20. Causby, 328 U.S. at 258–59.
21. Id. at 258.
22. Id. at 259.
23. Id. at 258.
24. Id. at 261.
25. Id. at 264.
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Court took to define “immediate reaches” was to say that a taking
occurs when flights are of such frequency and proximity as to consti-
tute “a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use
of the land.”26
It is important to note that this case was a takings action instead of
a nuisance action.  Successful nuisance actions must only show unrea-
sonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land.  Alterna-
tively, successful takings actions must show a confiscation of
something owned by a private party in service of the public.27  The
Court could have said that Mr. Causby stated a claim for nuisance, but
it did not.  It found a taking, meaning the government used something
Mr. Causby owned.  Other things being equal, the “direct and imme-
diate interference” standard looks like a nuisance balancing test.  But
the Court clarified that landowners must have dominion over the im-
mediate reaches of the atmosphere.  So, the fact the flights constituted
a taking confirms Mr. Causby had a property right to that airspace.
Causby thus gestures to exclusionary rights for airspace under 100
feet; but what about airspace higher than that, and what about some-
thing smaller and quieter than a military plane?
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed such questions di-
rectly, it has looked at the issue of government surveillance by heli-
copter in low-altitude airspace.  In Florida v. Riley, the Court held that
surveillance from a helicopter flying over a residential property at 400
feet was not a “search,” so it did not require a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment.28  It said helicopters are not bound by the lower
limits of navigable airspace that constrain other aircrafts and that
“[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over [the]
property in a helicopter” at that height and observed the things the
government observed.29
Landowners may see cause for concern from cases like this one.  If
the floor of navigable airspace for helicopters is lower than 500 feet,
presumably that is because helicopters can fly at that altitude more
safely than planes can.30  If public airspace is defined by the aircraft’s
ability to safely fly there, then the navigable airspace floor will con-
tinue plunging downward as aircrafts like drones become more adept
at low-altitude navigation.
26. Id. at 266.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  (The Takings Clause requires just compensation
whenever private property is taken by the government for public use.  Explicitly built
into this provision is the prerequisite that “private property” that is taken.).
28. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
29. Id. at 451.
30. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012) (defining “navigable airspace” as airspace
at or above safe altitudes of flight) (emphasis added).
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There may be less cause for concern than first appears.  Cases in-
volving a search, such as Riley, are bound by expectations of privacy.31
The fact that members of the public could fly a helicopter at 400 feet
meant the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against the same activity by the police.  Next, the fact that members of
the public could legally fly a helicopter at 400 feet does not mean
property owners forced to allow such activities over their houses have
no cause of action.  Finally, in Riley, the Court thought people could
fly helicopters at 400 feet because the FAA lacks jurisdiction there.32
So, though Riley addressed the issue of government surveillance in
low-altitude airspace, it did not address exclusionary rights enforcea-
ble in private suits.
B. Exclusionary Trespass-Like Protections
Low-altitude airspace rights are not generally governed by vague
nuisance-like balancing tests.  Instead, as Professor Rule has noted,
“[m]ost areas of property law treat low-altitude airspace as equivalent
to surface land, using exclusion-based rules to strongly protect land-
owners’ interests in that space.”33  Because these exclusionary rights
do not depend on the form of encroachment or the severity of result-
ing harm, the right truly is a property interest34 that could be enforced
against something like drone flights as well.
Surface level trespass laws give landowners the right to exclude
others from entering their land.  This can come in the form of an in-
junction against further invasion of the property or damages for past
trespasses.35  Importantly, damages are generally available even if the
trespass caused no real harm to the land.36  Courts consider the “right
to exclude” as such a vital stick in the bundle of property rights that
they presume harm whenever a party infringes on that right.37
Courts have recognized a similar right to exclude from low-altitude
airspace in some contexts.  For example, property owners generally
have the right to exclude neighbors from encroaching across the prop-
erty line with tree branches, buildings, or other structures.38  Similar
to trespass to surface land, the landowner’s right to exclude does not
31. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “police
observation of the greenhouse in Riley’s curtilage from a helicopter passing at an
altitude of 400 feet did not violate an expectation of privacy.”).
32. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (“[the Court] would have a different case if flying at that
altitude had been contrary to law or regulation.”).
33. Rule, supra note 6, at 182.
34. Instead of a “liability” interest.
35. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 163–64 (Wis. 1997) (af-
firming a $100,000 punitive damage award for a trespass in addition to mere
injunction).
36. See, e.g., id. (affirming a damage award for a trespass even when there was no
harm done to the plaintiff’s property).
37. Id. at 159.
38. Rule, supra note 6, at 182–83.
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depend on a showing of harm or that the encroachment interferes
with the landowner’s use and enjoyment of her property.39
The same rights could apply to airspace encroachments via flights.
Post-Causby, governments typically pay private parties near airports
for easements to travel through the low-altitude airspace or gain pre-
scriptive easements through frequent extended use.40  An easement
assumes the traversed area belongs to someone else.41  So, the as-
sumption post-Causby that governments need easements to fly in the
low-altitude airspace over private land shows that contracting parties
think this space belongs to the landowners.
Because post-Causby landowners presumptively own the airspace
above their land, the balancing test in Causby is best understood not
as a test of the reaches of the landowner’s ownership of the air, but as
a test of when that property has been taken.  For the government to
“take” property, another must own the property.42  As this Article ex-
plains in Part IV, other cases show that formal forced easements are
problematic because of their permanent and trespassory nature.  So,
Causby speaks to overhead flights that are not from formal easements
but are so frequent and intrusive they become like easements, and
thus are takings.
III. THE NAVIGABILITY EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS
Landowners’ exclusionary rights sometimes must yield to the com-
mon law doctrine of navigability.43  Some resources, especially water,
must be kept open to travel even if the landowner may take advantage
of other sticks in the bundle of rights over that space, like the right to
sell.44  Even so, because of landowner expectation interests and the
alternative means of travel available, the rules of navigable waters
should not apply to low-altitude airspace.
The doctrine of navigability states that private parties who own
property with surface water must sometimes allow others to pass
through on that water.45  This doctrine developed mostly in the 19th
39. Id. at 183.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Easement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (The Takings Clause prohibits “private property” from
being taken for public use without just compensation. The Clause is therefore only
applicable in instances where the taken property belonged to a private entity at the
outset.).
43. See, e.g., Maureen Brady, Defining “Navigability”: Balancing State-Court Flex-
ibility and Private Rights in Waterways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1419 (2015) (ex-
plaining that “[n]avigability comes into state law through operation of the public trust
doctrine, which dictates that the public has property rights in some natural resources
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century when the logging industry started to boom.46  Courts began to
hold that private landowners must allow logs to be shipped on the
water passing through their land.47  Over the years, different states
have classified waters as “navigable” based on different measures,
such as whether a log could float on it, whether a vessel could sail on
it, or whether it could be used recreationally.48  Owners of “naviga-
ble” waters lost their right to exclude parties who used the water for
qualified purposes.
Courts placed these obligations on landowners partially because of
industry necessity.  The logging industry became important to 19th
century society, and water-based shipping was the primary means of
commercial transport long before that.  With the railroad system rela-
tively new to the scene as a feasible alternative for large-scale ship-
ping, water was among the most effective channels for intra-national
commercial travel.49  If loggers could not ship by water, they could
hardly ship at all.50  On the backdrop of the deep-rooted importance
of water transport to commerce, courts in the 1800s concluded that all
private ownership carried an implied limitation on the right to exclude
people from using waters suited for transport.51
Implied navigability probably should not apply to low-level airspace
because such space is neither historically nor currently crucial to com-
merce and travel.  By the time 19th century courts required landown-
ers to keep waterways open, waterway shipping was long established.
Low-altitude airspace, however, has not yet been substantially used
for shipping or travel.  Most shipping and travel within the United
States occurs either on the ground or in high-altitude airspace.52  So,
today’s shippers and travelers have different expectations than loggers
did.  In the 19th century, companies would have had to reorganize
46. Id. at 1427.
47. See id. at 1429–30.
48. Id. at 1434–35, 1438.
49. See, e.g., J.N. Bowman, Driving the Last Spike at Promontory, 1869, 36 CAL.
HIST. SOC’Y Q. 97 (1957) (explaining that the first transcontinental railroad was com-
pleted in 1869).
50. Brady, supra note 43, at 1429 (“Without giving the public uninhibited use of
even trivially passable waterways, [courts] reasoned, wood could not make it to
market.”).
51. See, e.g., Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1866) (“There can
be no doubt that the rule of the common law, as to what degree of capacity renders a
river navigable, in fact, should be received, in this country, with such modifications as
will adapt it to the peculiar character of our streams, and the commerce for which they
may be used.”) (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Jerry Hirsch, 253 Million Cars and Trucks on U.S. Roads; Average
Age is 11.4 Years, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2014, 8:36 AM), http://www.latimes.com/busi-
ness/autos/la-fi-hy-ihs-automotive-average-age-car-20140609-story.html (noting how
the number of cars and trucks regularly traveling on roads in the U.S. reached a re-
cord high at the time of the article); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, Air Traffic, NOAA, https://sos.noaa.gov/datasets/air-traffic/ (last visited Apr. 22,
2018) (noting that there are over 2,000 cargo airplane flights per day in the United
States).
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their entire business model to operate if they could not access naviga-
ble waters.  But today few to none would have to change current prac-
tices if they could not access low-altitude airspace; they do not use it
in the first place.
They do not use low-altitude airspace because there is no practical
necessity to use it like there was for water in the 1800s.  Because
ground and airplane transportation is expansive and sophisticated,
probably no industry will collapse without the additional availability
of low-altitude airspace transportation.  True, future advances in
drone technology may make low-altitude airspace shipping much
more efficient and profitable compared to ground and airplane ship-
ping.  Courts may also feel more pressure to redefine navigability in
the interest of economic efficiency.  However, they should mind the
constitutional limitations to making unforeseeable changes to estab-
lished property rights.53
Landowner expectation interests also disfavor implied navigability
in low-altitude airspace.  A landowner with navigable water is on no-
tice as to exactly what portion of the property will be stuck with an
implied easement, not only because the common law says so, but also
because the water itself occupies a determinate area.  Imagine a devel-
oper who purchases a parcel of land in the suburbs.  The land has a
large stream running across the middle.  Upon learning the water is
navigable, the developer would know it could not alter the stream so
as to make it untraversable from upstream.  As the developer went
about its business, making an apartment building, perhaps, it could
build to its heart’s content and on its own time, knowing that its rights
as to the stream stay ever-constant.
Alternatively, imagine that instead of a stream, the land has air
above it (as land tends to have).  Upon learning that third parties
hope to traverse that air, the developer would have a predicament.
The air is not a narrowly defined corridor like the stream; it is all-
encompassing, at least up to 500 feet.  If the developer thought navi-
gability applied to low-level airspace, it would have two options: (1)
do not build upwards at all for fear of encroaching on areas that must
be kept open, or (2) build upward, but design the structures in such a
way that there is some amount of airspace open for travel.54  If it
53. See Brady, supra note 43, at 1418 (arguing that the Takings Clause, the Due
Process Clause, or both, should constrain courts’ abilities to redefine navigability in
when doing so would amount to unforeseen changes in the law and interfere with
landowner expectations); Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir.
1936) (“. . . but we find nothing therein to negative the ad coelum
formula. Furthermore, if we should adopt this formula as being the law, there might
be serious doubt as to whether a state statute could change it without running counter
to the Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
54. The severity of the impact on landowner interests would, of course, vary based
on the nature of the drone easement. This example has little relevance to instances
where the government action simply permits drones to fly in airspace that is not other-
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chose the latter, the developer would be unsure whether it left open
enough space, and whether it did so in the right part of the air.55  In
both cases the developer’s business interests are more hampered than
by navigable water.  Total prohibitions on building and uncertainty as
to legal consequences are both more severe to developers than keep-
ing open a preset narrow strip.
Water provides for easy outlining of the boundaries of the land-
owner’s rights, but air does not, so subjecting low-altitude airspace to
navigability rules necessarily devolves into questions like “how much
air must I leave open?”; “which sections of the air must it be?”; and
others that would cause developers to be hesitant in land
development.
Navigability exceptions to exclusionary rights are unique to water.
In Edwards v. Sims, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reaffirmed the ad
coelum rule for below-surface property.56  There, the defendant had
opened up a cave to the public for profit.57  The entrance to the cave
was on the defendant’s property, but the plaintiff suspected that the
cave went under his surface land.58  The court granted the plaintiff a
survey of the property, stating that because of ad coelum the plaintiff
would have the right to exclude the defendant from using any portion
of the cave beneath the plaintiff’s land, even if the plaintiff could not
make use of the space himself.59  Despite the dissent’s conviction that
the defendant should be able to make use of space that only he had
worked to utilize, the majority held fast to the rule that landowners
own the skies above and the depths beneath, regardless of economic
efficiency.60
Post-Causby, courts have only limited the exclusionary rights pro-
vided by ad coelum for navigable water and navigable high-altitude
wise obstructed (for then the landowner would not be prevented from developing
whatsoever). It would carry more weight in instances where the drone easement man-
dates that a landowner leave sufficient space for drone travel, and more weight still in
instances where the easement requires a landowner to keep the entire airspace at a
certain altitude open.
55. This is especially true if, as discussed above, the meaning of navigable airspace
could change depending on the type of aircraft.  The developer’s low-altitude airspace
that may not be navigable for planes may be navigable for helicopters.  And the air-
space not navigable for helicopters may be navigable for drones.  Even if the govern-
ment puts the developer on notice that “all your airspace is navigable,” the developer
would be unsure what that means – unsure as to what it could build and unsure how
much the property value may otherwise be suppressed by overhead flights of various
kinds.
56. Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Ky. 1929).
57. Id. at 619.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 621–22 (Logan, J., dissenting) (“[the majority] deprives Edwards of
rights which are valuable, and perhaps destroys the value of his property, upon the
motion of one who may have no interest in that which it takes away, and who could
not subject it to his dominion or make any use of it. . . .”).
60. Id.
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airspace.  These two exceptions were both driven by important com-
mercial or travel industries, a feature that low-altitude airspace does
not share.61
In other contexts, the common law treats low-altitude airspace as
the surface landowner’s property.  Property rights include the right to
exclude.  Courts have made categorical exceptions to the right to ex-
clude from certain types of property only when important and estab-
lished industry required it.  There is no comparable industry that
would similarly require low-altitude airspace. Therefore, under cur-
rent common law, surface landowners may exercise complete domin-
ion over this space.
IV. FORCED DRONE EASEMENTS AS GOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS
If the government required surface landowners to keep their low-
altitude airspace open to commercial drone travel, it might trigger a
Fifth Amendment taking and require just compensation.  The Causby
Court, although dealing with especially obnoxious and frequent low-
altitude airplane flights,62 expressed that a permanent easement of
flight may be a permanent physical occupation, which the Loretto
Court later classified as a per se taking.63  If the essence of such taking
is the restriction of the landowner’s ability to exclude from or use the
airspace, then forced drone easements may be per se takings.  If
forced drone easements are not similar enough to permanent physical
occupations to be per se takings, they may still be regulatory takings
under the Penn Central test.
A. Forced Drone Easements as Permanent Physical Occupations
The Supreme Court in Causby established that government flights
over private airspace are takings whenever they are low enough and
frequent enough to have a direct and immediate effect on the use and
enjoyment of the property.64  The Court further explained that any
permanent right of public travel through a landowner’s airspace is a
governmental intrusion of a particularly serious character.65  The
Court has paved the way for the proposition that any government ac-
tion providing a permanent easement of flight in low-altitude airspace
is a taking.  In Loretto, the Court held that a law requiring landlords
to maintain a narrow television cable on their buildings was a taking.66
The Court stated that a per se taking occurs whenever the government
causes the permanent physical occupation of a landowner’s prop-
61. If this state of affairs were to change, the outcome would not necessarily be
different with respect to navigability. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 43.
62. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946).
63. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982).
64. Causby, 328 U.S. at 266.
65. Id. at 264–65.
66. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
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erty.67  If drone easements fell into this category, affected surface
landowners would be entitled to just compensation without delving
into nuisance-like balancing tests.
Although the Causby Court dealt with loud and frequent over-
passes by large government airplanes, the rules that drove the Court
may disfavor government action that keeps a landowner from making
full use of her low-altitude airspace.  The Court first limited the ad
coelum rule to the extent that the rule prevented air travel at any alti-
tude above private land.68  Yet, in the next breath, the Court reserved
some of ad coelum’s power, stating that landowners “must have exclu-
sive control” over low-altitude airspace above their land.69  It there-
fore thought that any permanent easement of flight is like a fee
interest taken over that airspace and thus a taking requiring just
compensation.70
The Court delivered the “use and enjoyment” standard to explain
when there can be a taking from repeated trespass, even when there is
not a forced easement of flight per se.71  Because the Causby Court
expressly said a permanent easement of flight would amount to a shift
in fee interest over that airspace, it implicitly recognized that when
there is no question the government has prohibited the property
owner from exercising dominion over his or her air, there is a per se
taking, not subject to the “use and enjoyment” test.72
That a permanent easement of flight may be a permanent physical
occupation also conforms to a common-sense inquiry into what a
landowner has lost.  Once it is determined that a landowner owns a
certain section of air, it is easier to see why government action forcing
the landowner to keep that air open to others’ travel is a taking of that
property.  Before the governmental action, the landowner has the
right to do with the air as he or she wishes, including travel, recrea-
tion, and development.  He or she also may exclude others from doing
67. Id.
68. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264 (reiterating that “the airspace is a public highway”).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 261–62. Before Causby, the 9th Circuit in Hinman, 84 F.2d at 758,
seemed to indicate that there could be no trespass liability in low-altitude airspace
unless the landowner was making actual productive use of the air. Causby put to rest
the notion that there may be no taking unless the landowner actually uses the air-
space. 328 U.S. at 264. Regardless of whether Causby effectively overruled this part of
Hinman, the Hinman court did not close off the possibility that even if a landowner
could not prove trespass liability, neither would he have to keep the airspace open for
the unwanted flights to continue.
71.  Id. Because the Court readily recognized permanent easements were perma-
nent physical occupations, id., the fighting issue in Causby is most reasonably under-
stood as the question of when a permanent easement exists.
72. Alternatively, but in the same vein, the forced easement could also be thought
to satisfy the “use and enjoyment” test. Just as the altitude and frequency of flights
can determine that the landowner’s use and enjoyment is so-interfered with as to de
facto “take” the property, so too an undeniable forced easement distinctly removes
the property from the owner’s use and enjoyment.
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the same.  After the government forces an easement, the landowner’s
rights are reduced to that of any member of the general public—prob-
ably limited to certain specific forms of transportation.  The land-
owner has at minimum lost her right to exclude and likely a
substantial portion of her right to use as well.  These are part of the
core bundle of property rights.73  If they are eliminated with respect to
certain property, so that the landowner’s rights look no different than
anyone else’s, the property has been taken from one party for the sake
of many.  The landowner would no more “own” the airspace than
would Amazon or anyone else who now may fly a drone through it
under the same claim of navigable right.
Compare an easement of flight to an overhead highway.  Imagine a
landowner owned a large plot of land in the country.  She was free to
build on the land as she wished.  She could plant trees, fly planes, or
even build tall structures like factories or phone towers.  Imagine then
the government built a highway over her land at an altitude of 100
feet.  The government made clear she could drive on that highway just
like anyone else, but she could do nothing to impede the travel of
others.  It is certain that the landowner originally owned the space
through which the road was built.  Yet it would be meaningless to say
the landowner still “owned” the space afterwards by virtue of some
title document because she could not exercise any of the unique rights
of property owners.
This is precisely what the Causby Court seemed to have in mind
when it effectively held that permanent easements of flight constitute
permanent physical occupations.  That Court made an analogy to an
elevated railway with no supports touching the landowner’s surface
land.74  It explained that whether the landowner actually tried to oc-
cupy or use the airspace, the forced railway would be a taking of prop-
erty because it would “subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the
property and . . . limit his exploitation of it.”75
Perhaps one could argue that an elevated railway or interstate high-
way would be much more damaging than a drone “corridor,” but this
would ignore the difference between liability and damages.  As the
Court said in Cress, “it is the character of the invasion, not the amount
of damage resulting from it . . . that determines the question whether
it is a taking.”76  The point of interest is the moment the government
exercises influence over property in a way that moves the property out
73. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Prop-
erty as a Web of Interests, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 285 (2002) (“The rights most
commonly identified with the property bundle include the right to exclude others, the
right to possess, the right to use, and the right to alienate (or transfer or dispose
of.)”).
74. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65.
75. Id. at 265.
76. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
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of the complete dominion and control of the private party.77  That mo-
ment is when the government effectually says to the landowner: “you
must keep this space open.”78  Once that happens, the landowner’s
rights are removed until further notice.  It is irrelevant to the takings
issue whether the government later allows someone to build a high-
way through the space, allows Amazon to fly drones at its leisure, or
allows the local military base to test-fire rifles through it.79
In other words, there is a taking once the government supplants a
private party’s dominion and control with its own.  The government
cannot retroactively make the action not-a-taking simply by using its
newly acquired property in a way that does not bother the prior owner
as much.  If the state took my land and used it to test new weaponry
on the local wildlife, I would be thoroughly displeased.  If it took my
land and built an orphanage on it, I would enjoy some solace despite
my loss.  Yet, in either case, I would have suffered a taking entitling
me to just compensation.
Therefore, the government could not avoid takings liability if it
turns out a drone corridor is less obnoxious than a plane corridor.  In
either scenario, the landowner is deprived of her right to exclude, use,
and develop in that airspace.
Because a forced and permanent easement of flight is much like a
permanent physical occupation, it follows that forcing surface land-
owners to keep open a corridor for commercial drone flights is likely a
per se taking.  In Loretto, the Supreme Court found a per se taking
from a law requiring landlords to permit cable television companies to
install cable television equipment on their buildings.80  Even though
the intrusion was only thirty-six feet of half-inch-wide cable, the Court
held that such a permanent occupation, however small, effectively de-
stroys the landowner’s rights to exclude, possess, use, and dispose of
property.81  The Court also explained that any regulation authorizing
a permanent physical intrusion is a restriction of “an usually serious
character” and almost necessarily a taking requiring just compensa-
tion.82  There has been a taking, regardless of whether the intrusion is
particularly harmful to the property or whether the government has a
compelling interest in the regulation.83
To better understand Loretto it helps to describe what does not
count as a permanent physical occupation or intrusion.  In Escondido,
77. See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 262.
78. See generally id.
79. See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel v. United States, 250 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1919).
80. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
81.  Id. at 435 (explaining that permanent physical occupations “do[ ] not simply
take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property rights: [they] chop[ ] through the
bundle, taking a slice of every strand.”).
82. Id. at 426.
83. Id.
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the Court said a rent control ordinance was not a per se taking.84  Al-
though the ordinance permanently mandated the amount landlords
could charge for rent, the landlords were still free to choose their te-
nants.85  They still had the authority to decide whether to let people
on their property; they simply were subject to pricing regulations once
they had made that decision.  If the law mandated that people rent
their property to certain other private parties, it may have been a dif-
ferent story.  In that case, the right to exclude and potentially the right
to use, has been taken from the private party and placed entirely with
the government.86  This distinguishes Loretto-style takings from other
property regulations.
A forced easement of flight looks more like Loretto than Escon-
dido.  The government would be telling landowners they have to open
a section of their property for public passage, whereas before the gov-
ernment action, the landowner could use and exclude others from that
space as they wished.
What if, instead, the easement simply required the landowner to
allow drone flights through its airspace to the extent the drones could
traverse it but did not require the landowner to keep any specific por-
tion of that airspace open?  The landowner could perhaps still prove a
per se taking.  The analogies to the overhead highway or the cable
would look slightly different.  This form of easement would be like if
the government periodically reconstructed the overhead highway to
snake around the landowner’s desired building projects or if the land-
owner could always decide where on its property the cable wire
should sit.  On the one hand, the landowner here would have more
freedom to make use of the property—different than when a portion
of the property is unambiguously and permanently removed from the
landowner’s control.  On the other hand, the landowner would still
suffer the permanent presence of a right of passage on its property.  It
keeps the right to use the property to some extent, but it permanently
loses the right to exclude.  These two considerations thus point in op-
posite directions on the takings issue, but the Loretto Court cared
about both.87
B. Forced Drone Easements as Penn Central Takings
Even if a forced drone corridor is not a Loretto-style taking, it might
be a regulatory taking.  In Penn Central, the Court held that a regula-
84. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992).
85. Id. at 530–31.
86. Id. at 527 (“[t]he government effects a physical taking only where it requires
the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land”) (emphasis in
original).
87. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (“[T]he owner has no right to possess the occupied
space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use
of the space.”).
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tion prohibiting Penn Central from building a skyscraper on top of
Grand Central Station was not a taking.88  It listed three factors to
determine whether a regulation is a taking: (1) the character of the
government action; (2) the extent of diminution in value of the prop-
erty; and (3) the extent the regulation interferes with the property
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.89  When land-
owners must respect a drone flight easement in their low-altitude air-
space, the character of the government action weighs heavily in favor
of the landowners’ rights.  The extent of diminution in value depends
on the geographic region of the property and the extent the easement
suppresses development.  And the extent of interference with reason-
able investment-backed expectations could vary substantially based
on the particular owner (creating potential serious inequalities in what
classes of people will have to suffer such easements without just com-
pensation).  The “character” factor alone may do enough work in the
Penn Central analysis to classify these forced easements as takings be-
cause of the intrusive nature of such government action.
1. The Character of the Government Action and
its Unique Importance
a. The Precedential Weight of the Character Factor
The more a governmental action is like a localized physical intru-
sion instead of a generally applicable regulation on behavior, the more
likely the action will be a taking.  This process acts as a sort of spec-
trum.90  At a certain level of intrusiveness, the regulation is a perma-
nent physical occupation, which is a per se taking under Loretto.91
Yet, even if the intrusion does not go that far, it may still weigh heav-
ily towards classifying the regulation as a taking under the “character
of the government action” factor of the Penn Central test.92  So, as a
government action looks more like a permanent physical occupation
and less like a traditional regulation of landowner conduct, it shifts in
character from not-a-taking, to almost presumptively a Penn Central
taking, to a Loretto per se taking.  Because a forced easement of flight
is permanent and authorizes physical occupation by parties other than
88. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
89. Id. at 124.
90. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 (“[m]ore recent cases confirm the distinction be-
tween a permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an occupation,
and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property”).
91. Id. at 421.
92. Id. at 433 (explaining that although “[an] easement of passage, not being a
permanent occupation of land, was not considered a taking per se, [ ] a physical inva-
sion is a government intrusion of an unusually serious character.”) (citing Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979)).
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the landowner, this factor weighs substantially towards considering
such easements regulatory takings.93
For flight easements, this factor alone may be enough to prove a
regulatory taking.  It is uncertain how courts might apply the diminu-
tion in value and interference with expectations factors of the Penn
Central analysis.  Regardless, other considerations counsel as to why
the “character of the government action” factor should be sufficient to
prove a taking.  The case law shows that there is a strong presumption
of a taking when the governmental action is an intrusion of an unusu-
ally serious character.94
Forced easements categorically tilt the scale towards finding a tak-
ing, irrespective of other factors.  The government action is more
likely a taking when it can be characterized as an invasion on specific
properties instead of as a regulation that merely “adjust[s] the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”95  The
Court has distinguished between “permanent physical occupation[s],
[ ] physical invasion[s] short of [ ] occupation[s], and [ ] regulation[s]
that merely restrict the use of property.”96  In Loretto, the Court
seems to have put frequent low-altitude flights, like those in Causby,
in the first category as per se takings, irrespective of the Penn Central
test.97  The remaining two categories—physical invasions that are not
Loretto takings, and any other less intrusive regulatory actions—are
both subject to the Penn Central test.
However, courts presume that physical invasions short of occupa-
tions are nearly takings.  In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Supreme
Court found that a navigation servitude requiring a landowner to give
the public access to its pond was a taking.98  It explained the differ-
ence between forced easements and other regulations challenged as
takings, and affirmed the particular seriousness of the former:
This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regula-
tory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation
of petitioner’s private property; rather, the imposition of the naviga-
tional servitude in this context will result in an actual physical inva-
sion of the privately owned marina . . . . And even if the
Government physically invades only an easement in property, it
must nonetheless pay compensation.99
93. Again, the analysis differs significantly depending on whether the easement
limits landowner development by mandating certain airspace remain open, or if it
merely requires the landowner to allow drone passage through airspace which the
landowner chooses not to occupy itself.
94. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433.
95. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
96. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430.
97. Id. at 432 (discerning that, “[t]he cases state or imply that a physical invasion is
subject to a balancing process, but they do not suggest that a permanent physical
occupation would ever be exempt from the Takings Clause.”).
98. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
99. Id.
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Thus, even if the Court does not always consider physical invasions to
be Loretto-style permanent physical occupations, forced easements
still are especially intrusive even within the regulatory takings
context.100
Removing a landowner’s right to freely use and exclude others from
a portion of their property has the same effect on their property rights
as building a road through a section of their property; it is a govern-
mental intrusion of an unusually serious character.101  Even if it would
not qualify as a permanent physical occupation under Loretto, a
strong showing on this factor will likely do most of the necessary work
towards showing a Penn Central taking, irrespective of the diminution
and investment-backed expectation factors.
b. The Policy Significance of the Character Factor
Some readers may still be surprised at this Article’s extensive reli-
ance on the “character of the government action” factor given that its
meaning has long been somewhat obscure.102  This factor should not
be ignored, especially when the challenged government action is more
trespassory in nature.  It serves as an even-handed constraint on the
government that the other factors cannot always provide.  In cases of
government activity similar to trespass, this factor may do the majority
of the work in demonstrating a Penn Central taking.
That the “character of the government action” factor can nearly
foreclose any pushback from the other Penn Central factors should
not come as a surprise considering the different facets of a takings
action.  The Takings Clause prohibits the government from taking pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation.103  The action
can thus be conceptualized in three parts: whether private property
has been taken, whether such action is done for the public use, and
what compensation to the private party is “just.”104  Every takings
principle and test discussed so far in this article relates to the first
facet—whether private property has been taken.  The classic taking is
when government confiscates title over property.105  Permanent physi-
cal occupations are per se takings because that governmental action is
functionally similar to the taking of title over a section of property.
These occupations are takings regardless of the amount of resulting
100. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433.
101. See, e.g., supra section III.A.
102. See, e.g., John Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory
Takings Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235, 11246–47 (2002) (describing the “charac-
ter of the government action” factor as “amorphous” and “seemingly open-ended.”).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 431 (noting that a taking “was as clear as if the
Government held full title and ownership.”) (citing U.S. v. Peewee Coal Co., 341 U.S.
114, 116 (1951)).
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pecuniary damage to the property owner.106  In the Penn Central anal-
ysis, the “extent of diminution in value” factor can speak to whether
there is a taking because it can help point to whether the regulation
“goes too far.”107  However, in cases of physical invasions like in Kai-
ser Aetna, it is clear that the governmental action goes too far without
any need to consult the resulting damage.108  The character of the gov-
ernment action is so much like the taking of title that the Takings
Clause is implicated almost by default.
As a policy matter, if the character of the government action could
not carry so much weight, Takings Clause jurisprudence might system-
atically disfavor less wealthy property owners.  Wealthier landowners
can satisfy the “interference with reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations” factor of the Penn Central test much easier than poorer
landowners.  The “character of the government action” factor draws a
line at the boundaries of what counts as property.  Since governments
already are more likely to take property in poor areas because just
compensation will be lower,109 courts should hesitate to give improper
weight to factors in the Penn Central test that would exacerbate the
inequality.
Eminent domain already has a problem with unequal effects.  The
clearest examples of this are the locations of interstate highways and
large stadiums.110  It serves the government’s purse to disproportion-
ately place these in poorer areas.  While we all know the shortest dis-
tance between two points is a straight line, it may not be the cheapest
distance.  It might cost the government one million dollars more in
construction expenses to build a longer highway that avoids a wealthy
area.  Yet, the government will still do it if just compensation is over
one million dollars less.  In the same way, assuming the government
106. See generally id. at 438 (finding a forced television cable was a taking, regard-
less of the fact that the government action may actually increase the value of the
property).
107. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–16. (1922).
108. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining that, in trespass actions,
liability is not dependent on a showing that the land was harmed).
109. See generally, Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the So-
lution of Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2005) (addressing
corrective mechanisms for governments’ tendencies to use eminent domain in ways
that disproportionately harm the poor).
110. See, e.g., Ashley Halsey, A Crusade to Defeat the Legacy of Highways Rammed




porting evidence “that bulldozing highways through where poor people lived was
public policy in the mid-20th century”); Dominique Wilkins, The Effect of Athletic
Stadiums on Communities, with a Focus on Housing, 88 INT ‘L DEV. COMMUNITY &
ENV’T 1, 1 (2016) http://commons.clarku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&con
text=idce_masters_papers [https://perma.cc/S6LA-5HRV] (observing that “[m]any
new athletic stadiums have been constructed in low- and moderate-income areas with
high minority populations . . . .”).
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seeks the most cost-effective method of reaching a goal, it will more
likely place the new football stadium in a place where the just com-
pensation due for taking ten acres of private land is half that of the
cost of just compensation in a wealthier area.
This may not seem particularly unjust as an original matter: poorer
residents may be disproportionately pushed out of their current
homes, but they are paid accordingly.  That is the point of “just com-
pensation,” right?
But there is another problem: that of the surrounding landowners
whose property was not taken for just compensation but who still suf-
fer harm to property values because a busy highway or noisy stadium
parking lot is now 100 feet away.  These people must initiate their own
costly legal proceedings to combat this harm but likely would have no
recourse, at least under the Takings Clause.111  So there are two likely
results: (1) they keep their home as the surrounding area continues to
deteriorate for lack of quality residential investment (a sort of positive
feedback cycle) or (2) they could sell for a substantially lower price
and be forced to relocate carrying less cash in hand than their home
was once worth to purchase a lower-quality house in another area,
where the government may again choose to build another road or sta-
dium soon, starting the problem all over.
Therefore, courts should not further disadvantage less wealthy land-
owners by removing the protective force of the “character of the gov-
ernment action” factor compared to the “interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations” factor.  Wealthier landowners may
more readily prove interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations because they are more likely to have the funds to invest
in property development and other capital-intensive land uses.   Less
wealthy landowners are rarely in a position to invest in significant de-
velopment such that limits on their use of land would interfere with
their immediate plans.
Perhaps one may counter that this also is a fair result.  One could
argue that while it hurts a landowner to impede development it had
the money to execute, it does not hurt a landowner to tell them they
cannot do something when they never had the funds to do that thing
anyway.
This argument has more force in traditional regulatory takings con-
texts than for forced easements.  Though some forms of land use regu-
lations only become a burden to landowners who are practically able
to engage in the now-prohibited action, forced easements burden
landowners regardless of their future plans.  If the local government
111. This is because, absent some sort of physical invasion, most regulatory takings
claims fail. See, e.g., John Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 183 (2005) (explaining that, in the regulatory takings context,
“if property retains some economic value in the marketplace, a takings claim will
likely fail, or at least the economic impact factor will not help the claimant.”).
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orders that two properties, one owned by Ford Motor Company and
one owned by a lower-income family, must not emit air pollutants past
a certain low level, the takings analysis could come out differently.
Ford would have a better shot at proving a taking since it has been
substantially limited in what it can do with the automobile plant it just
started building.  This result seems just.  The family would not have
engaged in any activity creating such pollution anyway, so the ordi-
nance would have no immediate practical effect.  Consider, alterna-
tively, a forced easement of flight.  If Ford could prove they were
counting on being able to obstruct the low-altitude airspace, or that
drone flights would otherwise hamper its business practices, they
would again have a better shot at succeeding on a takings claim.  The
end result for the other parcel, however, is not an unaffected family,
but a family who cannot make a takings claim and is still stuck with a
drone corridor over its house.
The “extent of diminution in value” factor of the Penn Central test
helps to correct for some of this.  But the point here is slightly differ-
ent: In the above scenario, wealthier landowners have both the “inter-
ference” and the “diminution” factors at their disposal to limit such
government actions or at least affect the government’s cost considera-
tions enough to incentivize the government to place the easements
over poorer areas.  Yet the less wealthy landowners have nothing but
the “diminution” factor—probably not enough without the other fac-
tors to force the government to frequently pay just compensation and
so be more hesitant to build undesirable projects in poorer areas.
The “character of the government action” factor comes to save the
day, at least a little bit.  This factor does not apply based on assess-
ments of cost, but applies based on whether the government has done
something similar to trespass.112  Trespass entitles the landowner to
relief irrespective of the property damage caused by the trespass.113  It
is thus a property, not a liability, rule.114  The introduction of this
property rule into the takings analysis thus triggers the clause when a
property right is infringed on at all, leaving the damage issue as a later
question.  This factor might not much affect the amount of compensa-
tion that is “just” once a taking is found.  However, it does serve to
increase the chance that a taking will be found in the first place, which
112. See, e.g., Kafka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 28 (Mont.
2008) (explaining that the “character of the government action” factor involves an
inquiry into “whether it is functionally comparable to government appropriation or
invasion of private property.”).
113. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997).
114. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1996) (explaining that property
rules “guarantee[ ] property right assignments against infringement through the
threatened use of . . . police powers,” while liability rules “merely discourage[ ] viola-
tions by requiring transgressors to pay victims for harms suffered.”).
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is important.  Let’s look again at the issue from the perspective of the
government’s purse:
Scenario 1: The government forces a drone easement into private
airspace.  Again, option 1 is to place the easement over the shortest
distance between the desired points, but this track goes through some
wealthier areas.  Option 2 is to increase the distance of the drone
easement to circumvent the wealthier areas and go through poorer
areas instead.  Assume, for the sake of argument, that in the wealthier
area all of the landowners under the drone easement could have cog-
nizable takings claims because they have the “interference” and “dim-
inution” factors substantially working in their favor, but that in the
less wealthy areas only about 10% of the landowners would have cog-
nizable claims because the “interference” factor does nothing for
them.
Scenario 2: All of the facts are the same as Scenario 1, except the
“character of the government action” factor is also in play.  Accord-
ingly, a forced easement of any kind is highly suspect under the Tak-
ings Clause.  Now, nearly every landowner in the less wealthy area has
a cognizable takings claim (at least in the sense that the claims could
run the gauntlet of litigation).
This shows that the “character of the government action” factor
does legitimate work to increase the number of cognizable takings
claims for less wealthy landowners.  Now, it is true that a government
choosing between paying just compensation for X distance of ease-
ment in a wealthier area and X distance in a less wealthy area will still
probably choose the less wealthy area.  However, the calculus has
changed where the government compares taking and paying for X dis-
tance in a wealthy area and X+Y distance in a less wealthy area.  The
character of the government action factor increases the number of
properties in the less wealthy areas with cognizable takings claims.  It
will cost the government more to take a longer route even if the route
goes through a less wealthy area—the government will be forced to
pay out just compensation more often.
In some cases, this may persuade the government to run its drone
easement through a short distance in a wealthy area instead of a
longer distance in a poorer area.  Given the present inequitable conse-
quences of eminent domain use, the “character of the government ac-
tion” factor may be one of the few supports for structural equality
built into takings jurisprudence.
All this is not to propose sweeping reforms to eminent domain law
or takings jurisprudence; it is simply to demonstrate that the “charac-
ter of the government action” factor as it can be read now provides a
valuable safeguard against inequalities that may not be addressable by
other provisions (like the Equal Protection Clause).  Policy considera-
tions, therefore, support the precedent in justifying a special reliance
on this Penn Central factor in the context of drone easements.
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2. The Extent of Diminution in Value
The value of airspace rights can vary based on geographic location,
so it is difficult to say how much the “extent of diminution in value”
factor of the Penn Central test weighs towards classifying forced drone
easements as regulatory takings.  The Penn Coal Court considered the
extent of diminution in property value as a way to measure when a
regulation has gone “too far.”115  There, the justices disagreed about
whether the diminution in value should be measured against the prop-
erty as a whole or against the particular right in question.116  This dis-
pute has been called the “denominator problem.”117  Later, in Penn
Central, the Court resolved the dispute in favor of the “parcel as a
whole” camp.118  A plaintiff property owner thus will not be able to
prove its claim simply by showing that its rights as to one particular
section of its property have been substantially eliminated.  It must in-
stead show that its loss substantially harms the value of the whole
property.119
The value of the airspace above surface land may vary substantially
by geographic area, making it difficult to assess the diminution in
value in general, disconnected from any specific case.  Different re-
gions likely place different values on the ability to build upwards or
even on the ability to develop at ground level free from aircraft flying
closely overhead.  In rural areas, property values may not be substan-
tially enhanced by the landowner’s ability to build vertically up to 400
feet.  However, in many large cities where horizontal space is limited,
the ability to build vertically without rising into an overhead drone
swarm may make up a substantial portion of the property value.  In
New York City, for example, over 6,000 buildings exceed 100 feet in
height.120  There, a forced drone corridor at a height of 100 feet, or
even higher, could limit the number of potential tenants a developer
may attain for their building spaces.  The fair market value of a parcel
burdened by a drone easement will be lower than a parcel without the
easement.
Yet, even rural properties could suffer a diminution in value.  This
may come less from the limits on construction and more from intangi-
115. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922).
116. Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“If we are to consider the value of the coal
kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it with the value of all other parts
of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the
whole property.”).
117. See, e.g., Giovanella v. Conservation Comm’n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 456
(Mass. 2006).
118. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31 (“In deciding whether a particu-
lar governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole . . . .”).
119. Id.
120. Buildings in New York City (Existing), EMPORIS, https://www.emporis.com/
city/101028/new-york-city-ny-usa/status/existing/301 (last visited Sept. 14, 2019).
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ble drawbacks from aircrafts flying over private land at low altitudes.
The market value of land could be affected by what happens directly
above that land.  Perhaps a potential buyer will be deterred from pay-
ing a certain price if they suspect they will often have to watch drones
fly overhead.  Not only may this impair serenity and aesthetics, but it
may raise privacy concerns.  Many private drones carry cameras,121
and a property’s value may drop if members of the public can spy on
the property from just above the surface.
The extent of diminution in property value could also vary based on
the nature of the easement.  There are two broad forms drone zoning
could take: (1) a government mandate that landowners permit drones
to fly through any airspace which the landowner does not occupy
themselves with structures, or (2) a government mandate that certain
airspace must remain unobstructed for drone travel.
In either case, the landowner will suffer a diminution in property
value.  In the first, from less tangible injury—losing the right to ex-
clude and from having foreign objects swarm the air; in the second,
from all of that plus restrictions on building.  The diminution would be
greater in the second.
3. Interference with Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The more notice landowners have that they will be forced to allow a
drone corridor over their land, the less likely the governmental action
is a taking.  The Penn Central Court listed “interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations” as a factor to consider in determining
whether a regulation has gone too far and is a taking.122  The Supreme
Court later clarified that only reasonable expectations of the property
owner may factor into the analysis.123  Even so, a plaintiff can prove a
taking when the regulation burdened the property at the time the
plaintiff purchased it.124
As of now, the expectations of property owners may weigh towards
classifying any forced easement of flight as a taking.  First, there are
no laws on the books right now forcing landowners anywhere in the
United States to keep open a drone corridor above their land.  Sec-
ond, the common practice is to compensate landowners for flying
above their land.  In fact, post-Causby, it is the common practice of
governments to compensate people near airports for easements of
flight through their low-altitude airspace.125
Also, many developers would waste substantial funds buying prop-
erty and planning for its development if, in the process, they learned
121. The Top Professional Drones for Serious Commercial UAV Pilots, UAV
COACH, https://uavcoach.com/professional-drones/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2019).
122. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
123. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S 1003, 1034 (1992).
124. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001).
125. Rule, supra note 6, at 183.
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that their development was limited or burdened at the altitude of the
mandatory drone corridor.  For similar reasons as those discussed in
the prior section on diminution in property value, investment money
would be wasted and business growth would be frustrated.
V. TAKINGS THEORY APPLIED TO FORCED DRONE EASEMENTS
Prominent theories predicting when courts will or should find a tak-
ing justify such a finding for forced drone easements.  This Article will
focus on two theories: Professor Michelman’s felicific calculus126 and
Professor Treanor’s public choice theory of takings.127  Both of these
tend to show that classifying forced drone easements as takings incen-
tivizes the government to take only an economically efficient amount.
Under Professor Michelman’s Felicific Calculus, a government
should move forward with its action only when the benefits to winners
exceed the costs to the losers.  Winners’ benefits are measured by the
amount the private parties who want the government to act would pay
to get the government to act.  The loser’s costs are measured by what
those who do not want the government to act would accept in ex-
change for allowing the action.128  If the benefits exceed the cost and
the government moves forward with its action, the government should
compensate the losers whenever demoralization costs exceed settle-
ment costs.129  Demoralization costs include detriment to all parties
who see the government’s action and are thereby discouraged to in-
vest in their own property for fear of what the government may do in
the future.130  Settlement costs are the dollar value of the time and
resources those who want the government action would pay to pri-
vately settle with all those who would be negatively affected.131
Forcing drone easements may be inefficient in the first place.  The
benefits to the winners would be what the drone shippers like Ama-
zon and similar entities, plus any lay persons particularly enthused
about drone shipping, would pay to secure the drone easement.132
The costs to the losers would be the minimum amount that all nega-
tively affected parties would accept to allow the drone easement.133
These specific amounts would vary based on locality, but this Arti-
cle will focus on large cities like New York, because those are likely
the first locations Amazon would install its “Hives.”134  Again, air-
126. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
127. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
128. Michelman, supra note 126, at 1173–74.
129. Id. at 1214.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1174.
133. Id.
134. See Yurieff, supra note 2.
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space rights are probably more valuable in large cities.  So the “losers”
in the event of a forced drone easement would demand a substantial
price to accept the easement.  This price may exceed what Amazon
and other drone shipping proponents would be willing to pay for a
couple reasons. First, city road systems are so developed and dense
that drones could fly entirely over public roads (avoiding private
property law issues almost all together) without taking a particularly
inefficient delivery route.  Amazon may prefer to cut corners out of its
flight paths.  But if this only sheds a couple minutes off the delivery
time, the benefit to Amazon would not likely exceed the cost to secure
such easements in a place where air space is so valuable.  Second, if
ground shipping options are readily available, then customers may
barely benefit from the additional use of drones.
If the government did choose to force drone easements, the felicific
calculus would classify it as a taking and demand compensation.  The
calculus demands compensation when demoralization costs exceed
settlement costs.135  Demoralization costs in this context would in-
clude all harm and anti-developmental incentives suffered by anyone
who fears their property may become subject to a forced drone ease-
ment.  Settlement costs would be the value of time and resources it
would cost entities like Amazon to reach settlements with landowners
they wish to subject to the easement.
The demoralization costs would likely exceed settlement costs here.
If the government forced a drone corridor, developers city-wide might
worry that any property they own or will soon acquire will be bur-
dened by buzzing or limited in development options.  More than
likely, developers would be less willing to pay and invest in properties
and may shift their focus to other regions where there is less of a risk
of these forced easements.  The settlement costs to Amazon would be
more than pocket change, but probably less than the developers’ col-
lective fears.  Amazon, without the government’s help, would not
have to acquire easements from thousands of landowners in the city.
It would only have to acquire enough easements so that drone flight
paths are efficient enough to justify the drone shipping practice
overall.
Professor Treanor’s public choice theory of takings takes a more
political-democratic approach to identifying takings.  The public
choice theory seeks to protect property owners who suffer losses be-
cause of democratic “process failure.”136  Process failure occurs in one
of two scenarios.  The first is majoritarian process failure, where an
individual landowner is powerless compared to the majority public.137
Professor Treanor focused on this form of process failure.  Another
form could be called minoritarian process failure, where the govern-
135. Michelman, supra note 126, at 1215.
136. Treanor, supra note 127, at 784.
137. Id. at 855.
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ment’s action was brought about by biases created by the influence of
special interests.138  In both these cases, declaring a taking and thus
requiring the government to compensate forces democratic govern-
ment to bear some of the pain of its occasional shortcomings.139
Imposing drone easements may amount to minoritarian process
failure.  If everyone who stood to materially benefit from forced
drone zoning and everyone who stood to suffer some direct harm or
threat to property rights from drone zoning were gathered for a vote,
forced easements of flight would likely be voted down.140  However,
that is probably not how the issue would be decided.  Instead, the ones
who want forced easements the most, Amazon and similarly situated
parties, will likely push for the passage of drone zoning.141  Mean-
while, the at-risk land-owning population, though outnumbering the
other side, will be scattered and less able to mobilize resources to tank
the proposal.  If the government approved it, it would contravene the
majority will.  Requiring the government to compensate all landown-
ers burdened with the drone easements would either give the majority
comfort in the face of the government’s pursuit of minority interest or
would be so expensive that the government would not exercise its em-
inent domain power against majority interests in the first place.
If, instead, the majority of people were in favor of forced drone
easements, majoritarian process failure might result.  Perhaps the ma-
jority of residents in major cities would like to have drones deliver
packages to their balcony despite the political cost.  A large portion of
residents live in multi-unit apartment buildings or condominiums.142
But often only one person or entity on these lots actually owns devel-
opment rights.  So, even though the majority of landowners in the city
may be against the measure, the large majority of voting residents are
all for it.  This is not an affront to democracy in itself, but it must be
tempered by the Constitution, which secures protection against the
138. See, e.g., John McGinnis, Supermajority Rule as a Constitutional Solution, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 372 (1999) (suggesting that “the fundamental pathology of
modern spending patterns stems from the superior influence that concentrated inter-
est groups wield with legislators, even though such groups are far less than a numeri-
cal majority”).
139. Treanor, supra note 127, at 858. This is because, in either case, the government
is constitutionally compelled to pay those who fall victim to the wills of the group that
is able to persuade the government. Id.
140. Rule, supra note 6, at 163. As of now it is unclear drone shipping would sub-
stantially benefit anyone outside of companies like Amazon who are specifically lob-
bying for it. Conversely, it is clear that the practice may burden landowners. So, it is
more likely at this stage that the immediate losers would outnumber the immediate
gainers.
141. Supra note 4. Amazon Prime Air’s proposal for drone zoning based on alti-
tude level is an example. Id.
142. See, e.g., Quick Facts: Resident Demographics, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING
COUNCIL, https://www.nmhc.org/research-insight/quick-facts-figures/quick-facts-resi-
dent-demographics/#RentOwn [https://perma.cc/GMY7-W86H] (last updated Oct.,
2018) (noting that 36 percent of households nationwide are renter-occupied.).
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“tyranny of the majority.”143  Take another constitutional provision
for example: The fact that a majority of citizens may vote to censor a
newspaper does not deprive the First Amendment of its power to pro-
hibit government abridgement of speech.  Likewise, a majority of citi-
zens cannot vote-away the Takings Clause.  If minority landowners
cannot stop the drone corridor from moving forward in the political
arena, the Takings Clause prevents majoritarian process failure by at
least making the taxpayers pay for it.
The fate of forced drone easements is therefore the same under the
Felicific Calculus and the Public Choice Theory: If the government
wants to compel a transfer of property rights that private parties
would not agree to on their own, it will have to pay for it.  This deters
the government from making decisions against the overall public in-
terest, measured here by overall economic efficiency.  Amazon and
others will either have to incur settlement costs with other private
landowners or put that cost on the government through a forced ease-
ment.  If the latter, the Takings Clause insures that the cost does not
fall solely on the landowners.
VI. CONCLUSION
Amazon, Inc. has a plan to fill the skies with shipping drones.  But
to have a sufficient shipping system, Amazon would probably have to
direct the drones over a lot of private land.  Amazon maintains that
the government could designate sections of low-altitude airspace as
“zoned” for certain forms of drone flight.  If the government chooses
to force landowners to recognize a drone easement in their low-alti-
tude airspace, whether or not the landowners have a takings claim
depends first on whether they have a property interest in that air-
space.  The question of the upward reaches of a landowner’s owner-
ship has not been totally resolved, but there is sufficient precedent
across the common law showing that landowners have exclusionary
rights over low-altitude airspace.
Assuming this airspace does belong to the underlying landowner,
the next question is whether the government “takes” that space by
forcing the landowner to keep it open for drone flights.  If a forced
drone easement is like a permanent physical occupation then the ac-
tion is a per se taking.  Precedent supports this classification.  Regard-
less, precedent and policy implications of the Penn Central test
announce that forced easements of flight are governmental intrusions
of a particularly serious character.  That being the case, landowners
have a good shot at making out a takings claim even if the drone corri-
dor does not substantially impair their developmental expectations or
property values.  This is because the “character of the government ac-
143. See generally, THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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tion” factor of the Penn Central test provides even-handed protection
to all landowners subjected to trespass-like governmental action.
The Takings Clause provides necessary protections to landowners,
ensuring that if the government takes from the one on behalf of the
many, the funds of the many will compensate the one.  Moving for-
ward, Amazon will have a decision to make: buy easements from all
property owners underneath its desired drone corridors, or lobby the
government to declare a drone easement through eminent domain
power.  The latter course would not be easy, because the government
may have to compensate every affected landowner.  If not for Takings
Clause protection, this issue would be decided purely by governmen-
tal volition: once the officials have enough desire to see delivery
drones, they could make a sweeping mandate that all landowners must
allow them to pass through unfettered.  The general point of this Arti-
cle, though, is that because of the substantial support the Takings
Clause provides landowners, it is likely that whichever way drone
shipping comes to fruition, the surface landowners will be compen-
sated accordingly.
